Trm appearance of an official summary of the Canadian Army's history in the Second World War derives from the initiative of certain senior officers, among them General Crerar, who at the outset urged that provision be made for keeping an adequate record of Canada's military activities overseas. It may surprise a civilian democracy to learn that its military personnel had a sense of history and that they did what civil administrators and the leaders of business and industry have rarely done, and appointed historians to be their colleagues and scrutineers. But the taxpayer is normally so unwilling to pay for the protection afforded him by cannon, and has so little regard for the gunners that he is apt to deny them both funds and intelligence. It was with this prejudice in mind, perhaps, that the officers concerned took steps to ensure that the archives and the account should be properly kept, and that when the time came, and soon rather than late, the history should be written for the citizens to read. Such is the purpose of the present volume.
examiner, and custodian of the evidence, asserts a confident will to submit to trial by history.
It was in the national interest that the historian should be there. For every soldier who crossed the seas bore something of Canada with him, finely or rudely: we have had no greater impact on the world; nor have other countries had so immediate an influence on us as through this counter-migration en masse, sixteen thousand to a ship, which changed us by the hundred thousand into travellers abroad. The ordering of such an army is an imperium in itself; legions in far provinces develop systems and an identity and an ethic of their own. These phenomena are fugitive, yet perceptible and important, and should be competently observed. As for the forging of the weapon and its engagement, only those who saw the spectacle can know with imaginative force how immense the military achievement of this country proved to be, and only they are fully able to declare it to the people at large. As a demonstration of our maturi W it has a grandeur not to be forgotten in reverting to the barren provincialisms which occupy and disappoint in time of peace.
There is another aspect of the work of the Historical Section, more technical it is true, but worthy of remark in passing. This directorate, as part of the General Staff, that branch of the Army primarily concerned with operations and intelligence as distinct from administration and supply, came to enlarge its functions into those of an agency for the collection and dissemination of reports on action in the field. These were useful in passing on the lessons of experience as affecting tactics and equipment or the tricks employed by the enemy. Thus the Section made its modest contribution to winning as well as to recording the war. Actually less use than might be is made of this organization for the purposes of professional training. The Germans, whose superb staff work caused us much trouble, apparently took a rather more practical view of their own great Historical Section, and regarded a course in it as a desirable part of the training of a staff officer. Many of our people could certainly have profited from such an experience in accuracy, thoroughness, and the wider perspective at the level of Corps or Army. But such discussion touches the bureau rather than the book.
A word ought first to be said, however, about the author. His qualifications are not only appropriate, but in combination rare: an academic training, an abiding interest in the army, service in the militia, a professional concern with military studies. To these he adds a unique knowledge of the vicissitudes and personalities of the army overseas since the time of his appointment as historical officer at Canadian Military Headquarters in 1940. His task was never easy. Not everyone in uniform comprehended the relevance of history to the urgency of the hour, although our best officers were the most historically minded, as were the most efficient formations and units: and it was as often Colonel Stacey's business to educate and persuade as to collect and collate. He was extraordinarily successful in making the Section and its wants known to the growing army in Britain, and when the time came for the Field Historical Sections to-accompany the formations committed to the continent, they were greatly sustained in their pioneering through the goodwill kindled by the historical officer at C.M.H.Q.
To add that this arduous enterprise in historiography was organized, directed, and in large measure carried out by a singleminded, tireless individual is merely to state the terms of Colonel Stacey's accomplishment and to say no more.
Writing definitively in several volumes on so large a theme must take time; but the public soon tires of waiting and easily forgets what exalted it the day before yesterday. Hazards may also be forgotten, and since in matters of defence forgetfulness breeds neglect, Colonel Stacey's "interim report" serves thus early to emphasize the extent of the military provision required to attain our present only relative security. The purpose of this shorter treatment is evidently much the same as the lengthier one to come: "to tell the story... in terms comprehensible to the average person. The main function of the Official History, it is considered, is not to instruct the Canadian soldier of today, though it is hoped that he will find it useful; the object is to tell the Canadian citizen what his army accomplished in the last war, and to provide him, perhaps, with the means of forming an intelligent judgment on military issues that may confront him in the future." In other words, this is history written not for the expert but for the voter, not to elucidate tactical doctrine but to form political opinion. The Colonel's departure from more conserratire notions is interesting to observe. To forsake the technician for "the average person" is justified, since the need for public education in these matters glares in absolutes. The professional, presumably, can look after himself. Yet one question arises. I raise it to venture no farther. Are the potential functions of the Historical Section as the repository of the Army's documented experience and as a workshop for tactical and organizational study directly from the documents, to be disregarded? Or is the Section to be viewed as a sort of literary annex to the General Staff? And what will come after the Official History?
This prelude to the main work is broad in scope. It contains an outline of the whole story of the Army overseas: the concentration, enlargement, and training of our forces; the false start in 1940; amphibious excursions; the campaigns in Sicily, Italy, and in North-West Europe; the expedition to Hong Kong To compress such a theme into some three hundred pages offers unusual difficulties: but {t is all there in essence, supported by maps in colour, illustrated with reproductions of paintings by the war artists, and put out in a format that would do credit to any private publishing house. Of the maps, it may be said that the soldier's preoccupation with topography has ensured that they fully complement the text, as maps so seldom do, being the joint product of care by the editor and skill on the part of the draughtsman, Lieutenant C. C. J. Bond. I have yet to hear that artists of any other country worked so close to him. One of them even overran his lines and spent ten uncreative days in a drainpipe before getting back to his friends again. The whole body of their work iy a national possession, too little known. In many ways the collection is able to convey atmosphere and actuality more vividly than they are ever likely to be rendered in prose, partly because the official brush is more subjective than the official pen, the canvas more direct and circumstantial, brusquer and more primitive than the page. The writer of history works always within the limitations imposed by his material--limitations which in the case of military records, as I propose to show, are severe in the extreme. The painter is less inhibited. His stuff is malleable: he arranges his properties as composition and dramatic propriety require. Above all, the result is personal to him alone. Whether, in lending themselves to the historical purpose, however, the artists became mere illustrators, as some of them were afraid of doing, is a problem for other critics to discuss. One must be grateful for such glimpses of their work as these, although at the next reproducing, the plates ought to be larger and should fill the page.
The text itself is in no danger of being thought impressionist. It is solidly factual. It is scrupulous. It is anchored in accuracy. The chapter given to Dieppe, the fullest statement yet to appear on that foray and based on one of the most complete investigations ever undertaken of a single day's operation, is the only one in which the author permits himself to enlarge upon the narrative with critical comment. Elsewhere he is wary of commitment. His rule appears in the sentence with which he eschews discussion of Eisenhower's "broad-front policy" for closing up to the Rhine as against Montgomery's strategy of the "one fullblooded thrust" across the river into the heart of Germany. "Our concern here is not to contribute to this discussion but merely to record what took place." Clearly restriction here is proper. Criticism of the broader allied strategy would not be appropriate in a book like this. But is the extension of the denying ordinance to Canadian issues other than Dieppe justified? I think it is. The chapters are packed enough already without attempting to stuff them with unresolved controversy, even if the omission may leave the official historian open to the charge that he travels a thought too lightly. I would rather argue that he would have done better to follow the same procedure throughout, and reserve opinion on Dieppe for the measured pronouncement of his final volumes. His defence of the raid is too brief to be likely to satisfy its critics, especially the more authoritative, and omission of the grounds of their own case, that the operation was tactically unsound and educationally unnecessary, will do little to appease them. Rather can they contend that if the raid invited the Germans to improve the defences of ports with too limited a capacity to maintain an invasion on the full scale, the use of more commensurate facilities like those of Antwerp were denied us all too effectively. Nor can the sceptics fail to compare the claim that our reverse at Dieppe convinced the Germans that invasion could be defeated on the beaches (p. 86) with the statement that Rommell and yon Rundstedt were not in agreement on the matter (p. 181). Was it really Dieppe that persuaded Rommell, or was his obsession with the beaches the native misconception of a man who, according to Montgomery, "was no strategist"? The answer depends on a very precise relationship of cause The question will not always be easy to decide. The answer will ultimately depend on a view of the functions of an historian. If he i• to be a recorder only, he will do his best to write a disinterested chronicle, leaving analysis and interpretation, warning and proposal, to people like sociologists, tacticians, or the editors of newspapers. He will touch nothing political, avoid personalities, contemn the prophetic, abhor the sublime. Yet he may be more human. He may trust himself to go so far (citing the present instance) as to defend Dieppe, take pride in the martial prowess of his countrymen, and advise them (unless I mistake his inferences) that they must not imagine that there will always be time enough "to see suche a company together agayne when need is" if they pare and neglect their military establishment when the need is less apparent. Hence the intent of the official historian is revealed as being active rather than passive. The descriptive role of the reporter is eventually too irksome: the writer commits himself to a point of view. In that case, what he now has under his hand should give him his opportunity. In the amplitude of the forthcoming volumes he will have room enough to be magisterial, and perhaps require himself to be less modest in critical Nor is it to be forgotten that we fought with allies, still our friends, whose decisions were mixed with our own, as in the case of Dieppe, and whose affairs, as in the case of the Dutch, were seriously affected by what we did. Tact as well as restraint must guide the pen of a contemporary who will be widely read through foreign spectacles.
If one were to offer any comment on the literary style of the Summary, it would first be necessary to say something about the materials from which much of it has had to be written, and to remark upon the properties of the subject-matter. Military archives are the deposit of an immense but highly articulated machine, informed by a vocabulary that is sparse, precise, laconic, and monotonous. The resultant jargon suffices for all necessary processes and operations; every soldier must understand it and finds it readily assimilable. It provides almost the only form of expression throughout the overwhelming bulk of documentation with which an army administers itself and fights its battles. In the heat of action the paucity of this jargon may be heightened by confusion, stoppage, fatigue, error, annihilation. Yet this attenuated language, compact of abbreviation and co-ordinates, conveys by symbol the most desperate and savage experience known to man.
This it is able to do because combat, variable in incident, is only dual in form. The sequences are a simple alternation of attack and defence. The most complicated plan is an orchestration of either one theme or the other. The battle itself must follow a pattern admitting of little counter-change within the categories of success or failure. Both plan and implementation are hard to describe more than a few times, since they must be largely repetitive through the length of a campaign.
How often can a writer say that a battalion •tdvanced towards its objectives under heavy fire, and hope not to bore his readers? Far less can he hope to communicate that fearful climax in each man's life, endured repeatedly, from one summer to the next until the unit, its ranks renewed out of all recognition, rests on its arms. The pen's ingenuity can hardly render such a salvaging of individuality from the loud terror of hell.
The historian can be further baffled by decisions made at unrecorded meetings on the battlefield and by orders given verbally, leaving no written trace. Even the war diaries kept by units are often unhelpful and sometimes misleading. It may be quite impossible to discover from a diary' what happened in a battalion's most bitter engagement: perhaps no one ever really knew, so obscure can be the "fog of war." In fighting, the Canadian Army was as good as any, but in setting down thought or deed on paper its inarticulateness was excelled by none. I was once asked by a brigadier, a technician, whether I could recommend an officer to write a history of his corps. I suggested that technically one of his own people would be the best qualified to carry out the task. He replied that none of them could write English. What a commentary on our schools! And how much more difficult the work of the military historian ! For since accuracy of statement is his first essential, he must be accurate within the range of information available to him in the evidence. If that range is confined to a pin's head, he will be reduced to its circumscription: he can say virtually nothing and must use a formula.
Such unfortunately is the restriction imposed on our knowledge of many a local action and hence on the historian's ability to describe. Yet the panorama of battle is full and impressive; rarely might the reader of the Summary suspect the labours taken to produce the sentence; and though an occasional recurrence of jargon might irk the purist, he would have no cause to complain of overwriting. The test seems to be whether the author has been able to convey to those not there something of the exhilaration, tedium, endurance, and terror that move men through a great campaign. As one who followed in the camp, I think that he has probably succeeded, although for me, as indeed for all who travelled that Odyssey, the very names of the places where Canadians fought and left their dead have connotation enough.
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